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The deadline for this collection of articles was just a
couple of days before the referendum on continued
UK membership of the European Union, with the
prospective outcome still judged too close to call.
This removed any temptation to launch my
contribution from some forecasts of growth or
structural change in the London economy.
Withdrawal would inevitably have major implications
for this most international of British cities, though
what they might be, and over what timescale,
depends on whatever (realistic) Plan B might
ultimately be worked out. But even were the
decision one to ‘remain’, it seems very unlikely that
political life, and the policy parameters within which
London operates, will simply resume their course –
too much has been disturbed by the nature of the
referendum campaign, including the previous
consensual plastering-over of major cracks in
political/cultural attitudes among the electorate.
Starting off in this vein is not simply an excuse for
the vagueness of what follows; but rather because
the present state of affairs highlights some key
considerations in relation to future strategies for the
London economy. One is simply that, despite loose
talk about London becoming a city-state, national
policies/initiatives (and unexpected reactions to
these) matter very much more for the London
economy than anything which its political leadership
may choose to do. Another may be that ‘professional’
forecasts can often be substantially wrong (including
some of my own – see below), even when they
have independently arrived at much the same
conclusion.
The manner in which ‘expert’ analyses and opinion
of this kind were swept aside during the referendum
campaign – by members of a metropolitan elite who
happily deploy them on other occasions – is just
cynical. But what it has exposed (and exploited) is
the fact that a substantial proportion of the
electorate (mostly with much less education) reject
the kind of claims to expert knowledge on which
key sectors of the modern London economy
depend.
Since the 2007/08 crises of the financial sector,
with their deep impacts across the rest of the
country, there has been little evidence of the simple
northern revanchism which once figured among
credible threats to renewed success in this city.1
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But the Brexit constituency, as it emerged during
the campaign, is one which evidently rejects core
metropolitan values (of trust in educated expertise
and a Westminster politics, as well as of
cosmopolitanism) as much as those of ‘Brussels’.
And after the referendum it won’t simply withdraw
from the scene.
London – ‘project growth’ versus the boom that
kept on booming
At the level of London government, economic
strategy for the past 15 years has been dominated
by a set of numerical (trend-based) forecasts of
large-scale growth in numbers of jobs and residents,
linked to a qualitative narrative explaining the
inevitability of those trends in terms of London’s
role as a ‘world city’ (notably in relation to global
financial services). I have always been rather
sceptical about the scale of growth, the singular
explanation offered for it, and a lack of concern for
the evident volatility of the new (post-1980s)
London economy.2 I also had my suspicions (rather
like some Brexiteers) about the particular interests
within the Central Activities Zone (CAZ) that were
served by insistence upon the fact of such growth,
and the need to accommodate it within the Greater
London Authority’s (GLA) territory.
As it happened, population growth has actually
proceeded even faster than originally projected,
because external circumstances brought still bigger
waves of migrants from poor countries. And when
the long boom of the late 1990s/early 2000s was
eventually succeeded by the (expected) crash,
somehow that was not translated into the kind of
sharp downturn in London employment that the
(more limited) crisis of the late 1980s had produced.
Indeed, quite the opposite: even with an odd year of
(rather modest) contraction, London – specifically
the CAZ – accounted for virtually all net growth in
UK, and has actually grown faster than through the
boom years, or any other extended period.3 Whether
rightly or wrongly, hubris has been reinforced, and
GLA employment growth projections have
understandably been ramped up still further.
Three questions remain, however:
● what has really produced this remarkable new
expansion, in the wake of an evident debacle in
the supposedly key sector;
● how likely is this to be sustained over the 30-year
horizon of London economic plans; and
● how well does the character of this growth fit
with the concerns and aspirations of Londoners
(present and future)?
Elsewhere, I have tried to address the first of
these questions: rejecting generalised claims about
(Central) London’s demonstrated ‘resilience’ or
heightened competitiveness; but identifying some
specific contributors; and arguing for a less
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conventional explanation of the bulk that is not so
explicable. Among the specific components are: a
substantial sterling devaluation effect on international
tourism; a general explosion in head office
employment; two headline infrastructure projects;
and notable local expansions in hospital and
university employment (against the trend to
austerity).
The ‘elephant in the room’, however, is argued to
be the truly massive support to banking/financial
activities, in turn through bail-outs, implicit subsidies
(free insurance against future bail-ins), and
quantitative easing. Key effects of the last of these
seem to have included: flows of capital to emerging
markets, with UK effects concentrated in City-
focused support activities; and major boosts to the
international spending power of a plutocratic class,
sometimes resident in London.3 This factor is far
from stable in nature. But, for the present at least, 
it seems to have brought London very much closer
to Sassen’s conception of it as a global city4 than it
was around the time of her writing – with several 
of the negative consequences that she then
suggested. These are now, however, more a by-
product of economic and regulatory failure than of
inexorable globalisation.
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Whose economic strategy, shaped by which
elites?
In real functional terms the 21st century London
economy stretches out 50 miles or more beyond
the CAZ, with dynamic elements near the edge as
well as in the centre. Its effective political
representation is, however, confined to the Mayor’s
‘Greater London’ fiefdom, as are the growth
forecasts. Even within that territory, such
representation is problematic because the scale 
and character of its economy is so significant for
national economic and political interests. Little
coherent debate has occurred here about the
appropriateness of the growth strategy either in
relation to the interests of Londoners (of the median
voter, say) or of a rebalanced national economy –
and the (statutory) Mayoral economic development
strategies have been unmemorable.
At the start, indeed, it was the ‘spatial’ strategy
(aka the London Plan), not its ‘economic’
counterpart (authored by the London Development
Agency (LDA)), which committed to a ‘global city’
vision, quietly grounded in a belief as to what would
elicit Treasury support. And now, with a (slim)
Enterprise Panel succeeding the Development
Agency, its London First/McKinsey drafted economic
development plan, London 2036,5 had its priorities
endorsed in a ‘long term economic plan’ jointly
announced by the Chancellor and Mayor ahead of
the 2015 general election.6 Although more a list 
of intended actions (old and new) and trend
extrapolations than a strategy, the headline element
was a reprise of the 20-year old obsession with
outpacing New York’s growth, slightly recast to link
with more recent worries about productivity (rather
than simply GDP and jobs).7 This is pretty much
business as usual, but the open sharing of
responsibility is new.
Towards more productive and trustworthy
strategising
The new language and practice of explicit ‘deals’
made between cities and central government is
welcome. But ‘to give a voice to people here’, which
is what George Osborne claimed for this joint plan –
and what Brexiteers nationally appear most
exercised about – also requires:
● exposure of alternative strategies for debate
within the London region;
● consideration of which aspects have positive/
negative pay-offs for typical Londoners and for
major sub-groups likely to be differentially
affected; and
● consideration of which are primarily of wider
national interest.
To simply assume that what is good for ‘London’
is also good for Londoners, and good for the UK too,
is the kind of insouciant elitism that (as in the case
of migration) gives the subsequent deployment of
expertise a dangerously bad name. Mystification,
and worries about manipulation, are even more
damaging when devolution brings them closer to
home.
Less topically, it would be right, though far from
new or original, to conclude by saying – irrespective
of the referendum outcome – that determinism, a
one-eyed obsession with global city status (or
property values), and failure to acknowledge crucial
economic linkages across an artificial ‘London’
boundary (and well beyond) are, and will all remain,
fatal weaknesses in any economic strategy for this
great (but challenged) agglomeration. The most
encouraging signal in last year’s Treasury/GLA long-
term plan was actually the establishment of a West
Anglia Task Force to look at improving rail connections
up the London-Cambridge growth corridor, where a
locally-based consortium has shown a way forward
in developing collaboration and integration from the
bottom up, on an economically functional basis.
● Ian Gordon is Professor Emeritus of Human Geography at
the London School of Economics and a member of the former
Mayor’s Outer London Commission. The views expressed are
personal.
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